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Abstract 
There is an intense debate whether decision making under uncertainty is partially 
driven by cognitive abilities. The critical issue is whether choices arising from 
subjects with lower cognitive abilities are more likely driven by errors or lack of 
understanding than pure preferences for risk. The latter implies that the often argued 
link between risk preferences and cognitive abilities might be a spurious correlation. 
This experiment reports evidence from a sample of 556 participants who made 
choices in risk-related tasks about winning and losing money and completed three 
cognitive tasks, all with real monetary incentives: number-additions under time 
pressure (including incentive-compatible expected number of correct additions), the 
Cognitive Refection Test (to measure analytical/reflective thinking) and the Remote 
Associates Test (for convergent thinking). Results are unambiguous: none of our 
cognition measures plays any systematic role on risky decision making. Our data 
indeed suggest that cognitive abilities are negatively associated with noisy, 
inconsistent choices, which might have led to spurious correlations with risk 
preferences in previous studies. 
 
JEL codes: D81, C91. 
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I Introduction 
Typically, experimental economists use lottery tasks to measure individuals’ 
preferences for risk. For instance, in the Holt and Laury (2002) mechanism, 
subjects have to choose between lottery A and B in 10 decisions (both 
lotteries with two possible outcomes and probabilities), while in Eckeland 
Grossman (2002) they have to choose among six gambles, all with a 0.5 
probability of winning a higher prize. Generally speaking, Multiple Prices Lists 
(MPL) experimental devices such as the above may involve a lot of probability 
computation. It is often observed that about 15%–20% of the participants are 
                                                 
1 We thank Pedro Caldentey for coordinating the experiment. We also thank Behave4’s 
team (http://behave4.com/) for allowing us to use their platform. This project was funded 
by Excelencia Junta de Andalucia (2012-P12-SEJ-1436) and the Spanish Ministry of 
Science (PGC2018-093506-B-I00) 
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inconsistent; a percentage that can increase dramatically in non-student 
samples (see Charness et al. 2013). 
The truth is that lotteries or computations involving probabilities are not easy 
tasks. In fact, many brain areas related to cognition appear to be involved in 
probability calculus. In a sample of subjects making probabilistic choices, 
Berns et al. (2008) showed that brain responses (to probabilities) are 
consistent with nonlinear probability weighting. Indeed, they provided 
evidence for notable neural activity in a circumscribed network of brain 
regions that included the anterior cingulate and the visual, parietal and 
temporal cortices. 
Assuming that decision making under uncertainty (DMU) requires an ability to 
compute probabilities, it follows that choices by subjects with lower Cognitive 
Abilities (CAbs) might be partially the result of mistakes or lack of 
understanding rather than pure taste for specific prospects (risk preferences). 
However, if individuals are able to differentiate risky from non-risky prospects 
regardless of their innate capacity to evaluate probabilities—that is, even 
those endowed with low abilities can do it—then their choices reflect pure 
preferences for risk. This question is not new and has been explored using 
administrative, survey (incentivized and hypothetical) and experimental data 
(typically from the lab) on risk taking. In the following lines, we summarize the 
main findings for each of these three strands of the literature. 
Administrative data 
Christelis et al. (2010), Van Rooj et al. (2011), Grinblatt et al. (2011), Frisell et 
al. (2012), Cole et al. (2014), Beauchamp et al. (2017) and Angrisani and 
Casanova (2018) have studied the role of CAbs in risk-taking behavior in 
different contexts of life: stock market participation, alcohol consumption and 
smoking, saving, portfolio selection and violent crime. Such studies do not 
measure risk preferences in purpose-designed tasks, but simply observe 
behaviors or choices that serve as indirect observations of risk preferences. In 
this regard, Dohmen et al. consider that: 
while risk-taking behavior has been found to be correlated with various 
facets of cognition, the sign and magnitude of the correlation seems to 
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vary across contexts and studies. With a closer look at this variation, 
however, a pattern emerges. Cognitive ability tends to be positively 
correlated with avoidance of harmful risky situations and to be 
negatively correlated with risk aversion in advantageous situations. 
(2018: 120) 
This might be indicating that high cognitive ability is associated with risk 
neutrality. According to these same authors (2018:120), “evidence for this 
emerges both from studies of behavior in risky situations, often conducted by 
psychologists and psychiatrists, and also from studies focused on economic 
decision-making” as, for example, stock market participation. 
That said, since these studies use proxies that indirectly infer risk taking from 
observed behavior, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about risk 
preferences. For instance, time is an important underlying factor beyond risk 
(i.e., volatility) in many of these decisions, thus time preferences may also 
determine savings, drug use and violent crime (Åkerlund et al. 2016, Bickel et 
al. 1999, Meier and Sprenger 2012). Moreover, the CAbs measures differ 
greatly from one study to another. For example, Christelis et al. (2010) 
employed math, verbal and recall tests and found similar results for each of 
the three measures; Angrisani and Casanova (2018) tested separately for 
numeracy and “cognition” (episodic memory and fluid intelligence) and also 
found similar relationships for the two types of measures, while Grinblatt et al. 
(2011) combined psychological tests assessing mathematical, verbal and 
logical skills into one composite score. 
Survey data 
Chapman et al. (2018) used incentivized experimental tasks (similar to MPL 
with dynamic optimization) to elicit risk aversion in a survey conducted with a 
representative US sample. Their CAbs measure is given by the number of 
correct answers to nine items combining fluid intelligence, spatial ability and 
cognitive reflection. Booth and Katic (2013) used hypothetical lottery 
investment and a self-assessment questionnaire about risk attitudes (i.e., 
general and financial risk taking) in Australian birth-cohort data. However, 
their measure of cognitive abilities is just a proxy (academic performance 
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ranking used for university entrance). Falk et al. (2018) developed the Global 
Preference Survey (GPS), an experimentally validated survey data set of time 
preference, risk preference, positive and negative reciprocity, altruism and 
trust of 80,000 people in 76 countries. They elicited risk preferences through a 
series of related quantitative questions (hypothetical lottery choice sequence 
using staircase method) as well as one qualitative question (self-assessment: 
willingness to take risks in general). The GPS also elicited a self-reported 
proxy for CAbs by asking people to assess themselves by the statement “I am 
good at math” on an 11-point Likert scale. 
Chapman et al. (2018) showed that participants with higher CAbs are more 
loss averse and less risk averse. Falk et al. (2018) confirmed that risk 
aversion is more pronounced for individuals with lower CAbs. Booth and Katic 
(2013) did not find a statistically significant correlation between CAbs and risk 
attitudes. 
Again, however, the risk preferences as well as CAbs measures vary greatly 
from one study to another. In contrast to the above administrative data 
papers, these studies tend to combine their CAbs measures into one single 
variable rather than analyzing them separately. 
Experimental data 
Brañas-Garza et al. (2008), Oechssler et al. (2009), Cokely and Kelley (2009), 
Burks et al. (2009), Campitelli and Labollita (2010), Sousa (2010), Dohmen et 
al. (2010), Beauchamp et al. (2012), Mather et al. (2012), Tymula et al. 
(2012), Rustichini et al. (2012, 2016), Benjamin et al. (2013), Sutter et al. 
(2013),Taylor (2013, 2016), Booth et al. (2014), Cueva et al. (2015), 
Andersson et al. (2016), Park (2016) and Pachur et al. (2017) studied the 
connection between risk preferences and CAbs in the lab. The lab 
experiments typically involved controlled environments and self-selected 
samples of university students. CAbs were measured through different 
devices, such as grades, test scores, Raven’s matrices, the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (CRT) and graduate examination records, among others. 
These papers can be classified into three groups. First, several studies find 
that higher CAbs are associated with more risk taking, which is consistent with 
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previous studies using administrative and survey data (see, for instance, 
Cokely and Kelley 2009, Burks et al. 2009, Dohmen et al. 2010, Campitelli 
and Labollita 2010, Brañas-Garza et al. 2011,2 Rustichini et al. 2012, 2016, 
Benjamin et al. 2013, Taylor 2013, Booth et al. 2014, Cueva et al. 2015 and 
Park 20163). According to Dohmen et al., 
a second pattern that emerges from the literature reveals differences in 
the correlation between risk taking in lotteries and cognitive ability 
depending on whether lotteries only entail gains or also potential 
losses. In particular, and similar to the findings in several 
nonexperimental settings, experimental studies tend to find a negative 
correlation between risk aversion in lottery choice and various 
measures of cognitive ability when the lottery outcomes are in the gain 
domain, whereas the findings suggest a positive correlation between 
risk aversion and cognitive ability when the lottery outcomes involve 
potential losses. (2018: 125–126; see also Oechssler et al. 2009, Burks 
et al. 2009 and Rustichini et al. 2012, 2016, among others)  
Thus, according to these results, high CAbs individuals may be less risk 
averse and more loss averse. 
Second, null results are found in Brañas-Garza et al. (2008), Sousa (2010), 
Tymula et al. (2012), Mather et al. (2012), Sutter et al. (2013), Taylor (2013,4 
20165) and Pachuret al. (2017). 
Finally, while the above experimental evidence of a negative relation between 
CAbs and risk aversion seems compelling, much evidence has also shown 
that estimated risk preferences based on MPL are highly sensitive to the 
presentation of the task and to changes in the choice set. For instance, 
Beauchamp et al. (2012) tested whether choices over risky prospects and the 
                                                 
2 These authors show that reasoning ability and risk aversion are negatively correlated in 
males, that is, higher reasoning ability is associated with a higher willingness to take risks. 
3 Park shows that this result holds for a high probability of gain or a low probability of loss. 
When subjects face low probability of gain or high probability of loss the correlation 
reverses. 
4 Taylor estimates that cognitive ability is inversely related to risk aversion when choices are 
hypothetical, but is unrelated when the choices are real. 
5 In this study, the author finds that the inverse relationship between risk aversion and CAbs 
is not robust and that high-ability subjects may misrepresent their preferences when facing 
hypothetical choices. 
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resulting preference parameter estimates are affected by framing effects that 
are implicitly introduced by the experimenter. Their experimental results 
indicate that elicited risk preferences are sensitive to scale effects but 
insensitive to information about expected value.6 
Along these lines, Andersson et al. (2016) argued that the direction of the bias 
generated by behavioral noise depends on the choice set of the risk elicitation 
task. They argue that although different studies suggest a negative correlation 
between risk aversion and CAbs (Benjamin et al. 2013, Burks et al. 2009 and 
Dohmen et al. 2010), CAbs might be related to random decision making 
rather than to risk preferences. In particular, they show that noise causes 
underestimation of risk aversion in a risk-elicitation task containing many 
decisions on the risk-loving domain, but causes overestimation in a task 
containing many options on the risk-averse domain. They find that such errors 
are correlated with CAbs in a large sample of subjects drawn from the general 
Danish population. To demonstrate that the danger of false inference is real 
for standard risk-elicitation tasks, they chose two risk-elicitation tasks such 
that one produces a positive correlation and the other a negative correlation of 
risk aversion and CAbs. 7  Taken together, these results indicate that an 
observed correlation between risk preferences and CAbs is task-contingent 
and hence spurious. In fact, it is a relatively common finding that low CAbs 
individuals are more likely to make noisy, inconsistent choices in risk-taking 
tasks (Burks et al. 2009, Chapman et al. 2018, Dohmen et al. 2018). 
Therefore, in this branch of the literature the results are somewhat more 
mixed and seem to indicate that the relationship between CAbs and risk 
taking is highly sensitive to the task used and that noise or errors play an 
important role. Whether different CAbs measures yield different results has 
also often been overlooked, since much of the evidence is based on 
                                                 
6 They present subjects with several MPL and find that inferred risk preferences vary 
systematically with the type of list used. The lists differ depending on whether there are 
many decisions in the risk-averse or in the risk-loving domain. 
7 By presenting subjects with choice tasks that vary the bias induced by random choices, 
these authors were able to generate both a negative relation between risk aversion and 
CAbs in experiment 1 and positive correlations between risk aversion and CAbs in 
experiment 2.  
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measures combining different CAbs. A recent meta-analysis, which did not 
account for inconsistent decision making and excluded studies using self-
reported risk-taking measures and proxy (indirect) measures of CAbs, found a 
weak but significant negative relationship between CAbs and risk aversion in 
the gain domain but no relationship when losses are possible (Lilleholt 2019). 
However, further meta-regressions fail to find clear systematic moderators of 
this relationship (either task type, CAbs measures used, gender, or age). 
Therefore, the critical issue is to unravel whether there is a true link between 
DMU and CAbs (i.e., not due to noise or errors) and whether this link depends 
on the risk-taking task and CAbs measures used. To address this question, 
we ran an experiment with two important features:  
i) We measured DMU using incentive-compatible individual choices in 
both the gain and mixed (including both gains and losses) domain to 
elicit risk and loss aversion, respectively. We also tested for “noisy”, 
inconsistent DMU in the two tasks.  
ii) Given that there is an ample spectrum of CAbs, we asked our subjects 
to complete three different tasks: summations under time pressure (to 
measure mathematical abilities; we also elicited the expected number 
of correct summations to measure over/under-confidence), CRT (to 
measure the disposition to rely on analytical thinking vs. intuition, see 
Brañas-Garza et al. 2015) and the Remote Associates Test (RAT; to 
measure convergent thinking, see Shen et al. 2018).  
All the tasks were presented to individuals in random order. We used a 
representative sample of first-year, undergraduate Spanish students enrolled 
in Business Economics comprising 556 participants who made their decisions 
online. 
The results are unambiguous: we do not find any systematic impact of 
CAbs— math proficiency, analytical/intuitive thinking or convergent thinking— 
on decision making under risk in either the gain or mixed domain. Significant 
quadratic relationships (Mandal and Roe 2014) were not observed either. 
However, we find an indication that both analytical and convergent thinking 
are negatively (and somewhat independently) related to noisy, inconsistent 
8 
decision making. Since we observe that being inconsistent is associated to 
higher risk aversion and lower loss aversion, the above result might explain 
why some previous studies find high CAbs types to be less risk averse and 
more loss averse. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section focuses on the 
methodology used, while the results are shown in the third section. Section 
four concludes. 
 
II Methods 
Sampling: This paper uses a nationally-by-regions representative sample of 
n = 556 (the sample represents a population of 11,780 students; 52.5% 
females) comprising first-year, Spanish students enrolled in Business 
Economics (BusEc hereafter). We computed the participation or weight of 
every university in the national-by-regions representative population using the 
BusEc enrollment in September 2017 by universities provided by the Spanish 
Ministry of Education. This participation rate was the basis for computing the 
number of participants corresponding to each university. Institutions with few 
students were not included. Instead, the resulting shares were assigned to the 
largest universities of the same region.8 
Recruitment: In order to find students from every region of Spain, we first 
contacted university professors by email to ask them to collaborate. We only 
contacted the professors in charge of courses taught in year one (freshmen) 
according to the official webpage. We asked them whether they were in fact 
the lecturer(s) in charge of the course and then we requested the person in 
charge to help with the recruitment.9 All the lecturers were asked to announce 
the recruitment in class 48 hours before the experimental online platform was 
                                                 
8 The web https://sites.google.com/site/pablobranasgarza/projects/across-spain provides all 
the relevant information: weight calculations, maps and sample size by university and 
region. 
9 The two emails we sent are available on the website in both Spanish and English (see 
note 8). 
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open. Apart from other practical information, a specific login/password was 
provided for each institution in the announcement.10 
Participants: Self-selected participants logged in at home on Behave4 
Diagnosis (a webpage specifically designed to run economic experiments 
online11) and completed the tasks. The participants were given one hour and 
informed that after 30 min of inactivity the system would automatically switch 
off. Once the number of required participants for a given university was 
achieved, no more students for this institution were allowed to participate. An 
important issue here is that, in the absence of a proper lab, we have little 
control over subjects’ behavior across the experiment. Moreover, we cannot 
ensure that they are making choices alone. Nevertheless, online economic 
experiments are being increasingly used, and recent evidence suggests that 
the results obtained are valid and comparable to those obtained in physical 
lab setting (Anderhub et al. 2001, Horton et al. 2011 and Arechar et al. 2018). 
Earnings: One out of every 10 participants was randomly selected for real 
payment (i.e., each participant had a 10% chance of getting paid for real). At 
the end of the experiment, a random mechanism determined whether the 
participant was one of the winners or not. If selected, participants were asked 
for their email in order to contact them. Payments were made by bank 
transfer. One decision (from the entire set of games and tasks) was randomly 
selected for each winning subject to compute his/her payment. This has been 
proven as a valid cost-saving payment method in economic experiments 
(Charness et al. 2016). The 56 participants who were selected to be paid 
earned on average €41.37. The payments ranged from €0 (12 individuals) to 
€120 (2 individuals). The average length of the experiment was 50 min. 
Experimental tasks: Students faced a number of incentivized experimental 
economics tasks including measures of time preferences, risk aversion, loss 
aversion and distributive preferences. They also played seven incentivized 
one-shot canonical games on social behavior (Ultimatum, Dictator, Trust, 
Public Goods Game, Third Party Punishment, Stag Hunt and Beauty 
                                                 
10 Our system does not preclude the possibility of students sharing the code with friends that 
do not match our sampling criteria. A questionnaire helps us to control for this potential 
issue. 
11 https://diagnosis.behave4.com/. 
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Contest). All participants performed all the tasks in a randomly generated 
order with no feedback. All tasks implemented real monetary incentives. For 
this research we used the following tasks: 
a) CAbs. The CAbs tasks and measures are the following: 
• Number of correct 4-digit summations in 60 seconds (similar to the 
piece rate condition in Niederle and Vesterlund 2007): sumsi. This 
variable measures math proficiency in a stressful environment. 
Participants received €3 for each correct answer. 
• Expected number of correct summations in the above task: expect 
sumsi. Participants received €60 if they made the correct guess and €0 
otherwise. 
• 7-item CRT (Capraro et al. 2017; adapted from Frederick 2005 and 
Toplak et al. 2014). This test measures the disposition to override an 
intuitive/automatic answer to a problem, which is indeed incorrect. We 
obtain two measures: (i) Number of analytical or reflective responses in 
the test (reflectivei), that is, number of correct answers; (ii) number of 
intuitive, incorrect responses (intuitivei). They received €50 if they gave 
the correct answer from a randomly chosen item and €0 otherwise. 
• 13-item RAT (adapted from Mednick 1962). This task measures 
participants’ convergent thinking or the ability to find a single solution 
from apparently unconnected information, often referred to as 
convergent creativity. More specifically, participants were shown 13 
groups of three words related to another, single word and had to find 
the word for each item (e.g., for “square / cardboard / open” the correct 
answer is “box”). The measure of convergent thinking is determined by 
the number of correct answers (convergenti). Participants received €60 
if they gave the correct answer in a randomly selected item and €0 
otherwise. 
b) DMU. The basic measures regarding DMU are (see Appendix 3): 
• Number of risk-averse choices in a standard 10-item risk aversion task 
(Holt and Laury 2002): riskaversioni.. Earnings: A: p*€40, (1-p)*€32; B: 
p*€77, (1-p)*€2; p = 0.1,. . ., p = 1. 
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• Number of loss averse choices in a standard 6-item loss aversion task 
(Gächter et al. 2007): lossaversioni. Initial endowment: €40. Potential 
losses: 1st choice: 1/2*(-€10) + 1/2*(+€30); 2nd choice: 
1/2*(-€15) + 1/2*(+€30);. . .6th choice: 1/2*(-€35) + 1/2*(+€30). 
c) Additional variables and transformations: Besides the original variables 
defined above, we can compute a number of additional variables. 
• Overconfidencei = expect sumsi - sumsi 
• CRRAi: coefficient of relative risk aversion. This variable captures the 
concavity of the participant’s utility function in the gain domain. The 
larger the coefficient, the stronger the risk aversion. Risk neutral 
individuals who display a linear utility function have a CRRA of 0, 
whereas risk averse (loving) individuals who display a concave 
(convex) utility function have a CRRA > 0 (< 0). 
• Risk aversei, risk neutrali, risk loveri: binary variables take the value of 
1 if CRRAi > 0, CRRAi ≈ 0, or CRRAi < 0, respectively (0 otherwise). 
This distinction is important since previous studies suggest that it is risk 
neutrality that may be associated with high CAbs (Dohmen et al. 2018). 
• CRLAi: coefficient of relative loss aversion. This variable captures the 
ratio between the (dis)utility obtained from a loss and the utility 
obtained from a gain of identical magnitude, in absolute value. The 
higher the value, the stronger the loss aversion. Thus, a value of 1 
indicates no loss aversion, whereas values above (below) 1 indicate 
that losses are valued more (less) than gains. 
d) Measures of noisy, inconsistent DMU: Finally, we define binary variables 
that capture whether the individual made inconsistent (“irrational”) choices in 
the DMU tasks (e.g., multiple switching between options A and B or choosing 
the strictly dominated option A in the last decision). The variables are as 
follows: 
• Rinconsistenti takes the value of 1 if the participant’s choices in the risk 
aversion task were inconsistent. 
• Linconsistenti takes the value of 1 if the participant’s choices in the loss 
aversion task were inconsistent. 
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• RLincosistenti takes the value of 1 if the participant’s choices in both 
the risk and loss aversion tasks were inconsistent. 
 
 
III Results 
 
III-a Preliminary analysis 
 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for all the dependent and explanatory 
variables used. As can be seen, the sample is reduced in three observations 
for expect sums and hence for overconfidence due to the exclusion of outliers 
(using the mean ± 3 SD rule).  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (computed using sampling weights) 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent variables      
Rinconsistent 556 .177 .382 0 1 
Linconsistent 556 .139 .346 0 1 
RLinconsistent 556 .045 .208 0 1 
risk aversion 556 5.553 1.883 0 10 
loss aversion 556 3.449 1.410 0 6 
risk averse 457 .656 .476 0 1 
risk neutral 457 .232 .422 0 1 
risk lover 457 .113 .317 0 1 
CRRA 457 .546 .588 -1.713 17.662 
CRLA 483 1.499 .547 .714 3 
      
Explanatory variables      
sums 556 8.848 3.579 0 21 
expect sums 553 6.902 2.977 1 29 
overconfidence 553 -1.975 2.900 -12 27 
reflective 556 2.888 1.899 0 7 
intuitive 556 2.589 1.667 0 6 
convergent 556 4.784 2.285 0 11 
       
Control variables      
female 556 0.508 0.500 0 1 
income 507 4.713 2.321 0 1 
age 556 19.24 2.333 17 45 
 
In addition, all the dependent variables that require parameterization, i.e., risk 
averse, risk neutral, risk lover, CRRA and CRLA, only use those individuals 
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whose decisions are consistent throughout the task since these measures 
cannot be computed for inconsistent decisions. This involves excluding 99 
observations in the former four cases and 73 observations in the latter case 
(see Rinconsistent and Linconsistent in Table 1). 
Tables 2 and 3 show zero-order Pearson correlations between the DMU (and 
inconsistent DMU) and CAbs variables, respectively. The impact of CAbs on 
DMU will be studied below using regression analysis. Regarding the 
relationships between our dependent variables, we observe that the number 
of risk averse and loss averse choices, that is, risk aversion and loss 
aversion, are positively albeit weakly correlated (p = 0.03), as expected. This 
correlation becomes stronger when using the parametric measures of risk and 
loss aversion, CRRA and CRLA, which exclude inconsistent individuals 
(p < 0.01). Also, a larger number of risk averse choices is positively 
associated with being inconsistent in the risk aversion task (Rinconsistent; 
p < 0.01) and negatively, but marginally, associated with being inconsistent in 
the loss aversion task (Linconsistent; p = 0.09). These results translate into 
relationships in the expected direction, which are sometimes significant when 
the risk dummies (risk averse, risk neutral and risk loving) are considered. On 
the other hand, a larger number of loss averse choices is negatively 
associated with Linconsistent (p < 0.01). Finally, Rinconsistent and 
Linconsistent are positively related (p < 0.01). 
These results are important because they reflect the fact that being 
inconsistent is linked to a larger number of risk averse choices and a smaller 
number of loss averse choices. 
For the explanatory variables, Table 3 shows that math proficiency (sums) is 
strongly positively correlated with individuals’ expectations (expect sums), but 
negatively with overconfidence (both p < 0.01). As expected, sums are 
positively correlated with both reflective and, to a lesser extent, convergent, 
and negatively correlated with intuitive (all p < 0.01). Similar relationships are 
observed for expect sums (all p < 0.01). Overconfidence is negatively 
(positively) related to reflective (intuitive), although both relationships are 
marginal (both about p = 0.09). Finally, reflective (intuitive) is positively 
(negatively) related to convergent (stronger for reflective; both p < 0.01). 
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These relationships follow expectations according to the previous literature 
(Bosch-Domènech et al. 2014; Frederick 2005; Corgnet et al. 2016). In sum, 
our CAbs measures are all correlated in the expected direction, but the 
correlations are low enough to conclude that they capture different constructs. 
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Table 2. Zero-order Pearson correlations for DMU and inconsistent DMU variables (computed using sampling weights) 
 
risk 
aversion 
loss 
aversion 
risk 
averse 
risk 
neutral 
risk 
lover CRRA CRLA Rinconsistent Linconsistent 
loss aversion 0.090         
 (0.034)         
risk averse 0.776 0.104        
 (0.000) (0.026)        
risk neutral -0.434 -0.040 -0.758       
 (0.000) (0.394) (0.000)       
risk lover -0.586 -0.103 -0.492 -0.196      
 (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000)      
CRRA 0.989 0.109 0.718 -0.374 -0.580     
 (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
CRLA 0.144 0.899 0.099 -0.030 -0.108 0.149    
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.045) (0.544) (0.029) (0.003)    
Rinconsistent 0.130 -0.003     0.062   
 (0.002) (0.951)     (0.177)   
Linconsistent -0.073 -0.137 -0.119 0.135 -0.001 -0.111  0.156  
 (0.086) (0.001) (0.011) (0.004) (0.976) (0.018)  (0.000)  
RLinconsistent 0.045 -0.085      0.469 0.542 
 (0.290) (0.045)      (0.000) (0.000) 
Note: p-values in parentheses 
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Table 3. Zero-order Pearson correlations for CAbs variables 
 sums 
expect 
sums 
overconfidence reflective intuitive 
expect sums 0.621     
 (0.000)     
overconfidence -0.594 0.262    
 (0.000) (0.000)    
reflective 0.220 0.202 -0.073   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.085)   
intuitive -0.202 -0.179 0.071 -0.763  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.097) (0.000)  
convergent 0.138 0.167 -0.000 0.216 -0.132 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.996) (0.000) (0.002) 
 Note: p-values in parentheses. Correlations computed using sampling weights. 
 
III-b The impact of CAbs on inconsistent choices 
Before analyzing the relationship between the CAbs measures and the risk 
preferences measures, we explore the impact of CAbs on inconsistent 
choices. We have six explanatory variables and three dependent variables. 
This means that we have 18 models to test.  
Table 4 shows the estimated impact of our set of CAbs on inconsistent DMU 
using logit regression models. Each column focuses on a particular 
measurement of inconsistency, whereas rows refer to the different CAbs 
measures (each cell shows estimates obtained from a different model; the 
constant is not shown). We use sampling weights in all regressions.  
We find that more reflective individuals are less likely to make inconsistent 
choices in both tasks (Rinconsistent, p = 0.01, Linconsistent and 
RLinconsistent, p < 0.01; the opposite is observed for intuitive, but only 
significant for Linconsistent, p = 0.04 and RLinconsistent, p = 0.05). The 
individuals displaying better convergent thinking are also less likely to make 
inconsistent choices in the risk aversion task (p = 0.02; not significant for 
Linconsistent, p = 0.12 or RLinconsistent, p = 0.10).  
All the regressions are replicated controlling for gender, age and income in 
Table A.1 of Appendix 1.12 The results remain qualitatively unchanged.  
                                                 
12 Income information is only defined for 507 individuals, the rest is missing. 
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Table 4. The impact of CAbs on inconsistent DMU 
 Rinconsistent Linconsistent RLinconsistent 
sums -0.00 0.00 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.05)  (0.05) 
expect sums -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) 
overconfidence -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) 
reflective -0.22** -0.37*** -0.56*** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.17) 
intuitive 0.09 0.21** 0.25* 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) 
convergent -0.14** -0.12 -0.18 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) 
N 556 556 556 
Notes: Each cell corresponds to a different regression. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Regressions using expect sums or 
overconfidence also exclude the three outliers detected. Sampling 
weights are enabled in all regressions. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * 
p < 0.10. 
 
A second robustness check is implemented in Table A.2 (Appendix 1) in 
which the main explanatory variables (i.e., sums, expect sums, reflective and 
convergent) are all included together (since overconfidence is determined by 
sums and expect sums, we only enable reflective for the CRT since also 
including intuitive would yield collinearity).  
From this analysis, we observe that both reflective and convergent remain 
significant or marginally significant in predicting inconsistent risk choices 
(Rinconsistent) when included together, which means that they operate 
independently to some extent. Reflective is still also significant in predicting 
inconsistent choices in the loss aversion task and in both tasks together. 
Adding controls does not substantially change the results (not reported). 
We repeated the previous 18 models including the squared term of the 
explanatory variables (Mandal and Roe 2014). We can state that the 
quadratic model is better than the linear model if the following three conditions 
are verified: the quadratic term is significant, the linear and quadratic terms 
are jointly significant and the Bayesian information criterion for the quadratic 
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model is lower than for the linear model. Taking into account the above 
conditions, quadratic models are better than their linear counterparts in the 
following cases: Rinconsistent explained by sums, Linconsistent explained by 
overconfidence and Rinconsistent explained by overconfidence (see 
Appendix 2 for details). 
In sum, our data show that subjects who score high in the CRT and the RAT 
are less likely to be inconsistent. The latter implies that restricting the sample 
to participants who make consistent MPL choices implies selecting those 
endowed with better cognitive abilities. 
 
III-c The impact of CAbs on DMU 
Finally, we explore the impact of the different CAbs measures on our DMU 
dependent variables. In this case we have six explanatory variables and 
seven dependent variables. This means that we have 42 models to test.  
Table 5 shows the estimated impact of our set of CAbs on DMU using 
regression models. As in Table 4, each column focuses on a particular 
measurement of DMU, whereas rows refer to the different CAbs measures 
(each cell shows estimates obtained from a different model; the constant is 
not shown). OLS estimations are used for the continuous dependent variables 
and logit for the binary ones. We use sampling weights in all regressions. 
The results are quite straightforward. We do not find any robust link between 
our cognitive measures and DMU. We only observe a marginally positive 
effect of reflective on loss aversion (p = 0.09) and CRLA (p = 0.06). Thus, 
more analytic individuals are more loss averse, in line with previous studies 
(see Dohmen et al. 2018), albeit the relationship is rather weak. 
A second robustness check is implemented in Table A.4 in which the main 
explanatory variables (i.e., sums, expect sums, reflective and convergent) are 
included together (see above). From this analysis, we observe that the 
marginally significant positive effects of reflective on loss aversion and CRLA 
now become significant at 5%. The remaining results remain qualitatively 
similar except, again, for a marginal positive effect of expect sums on risk 
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loving. Adding controls does not substantially change the results (not 
reported). 
The models reported in Table 5 were repeated including the squared term of 
the explanatory variables. Using the same three conditions as above, we find 
that the quadratic model is better than linear model for risk averse and risk 
neutral, as explained by sums. The coefficients associated to sums and sums 
squared are, respectively, 0.13 (p = 0.20) and -0.01 (p = 0.06) for risk neutral 
and -0.17 (p = 0.13) and 0.01 (p = 0.03) for risk averse. In both cases, 
however, the power of fit of the quadratic model is rather poor and the joint 
significance test only yields marginal significance. 
Table 5. The impact of CAbs on DMU 
 
 
risk 
aversion 
loss 
aversion 
risk 
averse 
risk 
neutral 
risk 
lover CRRA CRLA 
 OLS OLS Logit Logit Logit OLS OLS 
sums -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
expect sums -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.07 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) 
overconfidence 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.04 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) 
reflective 0.00 0.07* 0.03 -0.06 0.04 0.01 0.03* 
 (0.05) (0.04)  (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) 
intuitive 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 0.10 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) 
convergent -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.01) 
N 556 556 457 457 457 457 483 
Notes: Each cell corresponds to a different regression. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. The differences in sample sizes across regressions stem from the fact that, 
except for non-parametric measures such as risk aversion and loss aversion, values cannot 
be calculated for individuals with inconsistent choices and are therefore excluded. The 
regressions using expect sums or overconfidence also exclude the three outliers detected. 
Sampling weights are enabled in all regressions. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
 
All the regressions are replicated controlling for gender, age and income in 
Table A.3 in the Appendix. The results remain qualitatively unchanged, except 
for a marginal negative (positive) relationship between expect sums and loss 
aversion (risk loving). Moreover, the effect of reflective on loss aversion loses 
its (marginal) significance. 
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All in all, our results show that there is not a robust link between our measures 
of cognitive abilities and DMU.  
 
V Conclusions 
Using a large, nationally representative sample of participants comprising 
Business Economics students, our study yields two important results.  
First, the study supports the hypothesis that risk preferences are not 
correlated to individuals’ math proficiency, analytical (reflective) thinking or 
convergent thinking.  
Second, we find that individuals who rely more on reflection than intuition and 
those displaying better convergent thinking are less likely to make 
inconsistent choices in the risk-related tasks. 
Therefore, our results indicate that preferences for risk in either the gain or the 
loss domain are not driven by cognitive abilities. Although we find weak 
evidence that more analytical/reflective individuals are more loss averse (in 
line with previous literature; see Dohmen et al. 2018), taken together, our 
results instead support the notion that low CAbs are related to noisy, 
inconsistent decision making. This result is particularly salient when CAbs are 
measured as analytical/reflective (vs. intuitive) thinking and, to a lesser extent, 
as convergent thinking. 
An important contribution of this paper is related to selection. If subjects who 
fail to pass the consistency requirement are dropped from the sample and 
these subjects are those with lower cognitive abilities, then the restricted 
sample selects participants who have higher cognitive abilities. Since being 
inconsistent is found to be associated with less risk taking in the gains domain 
(i.e., more risk aversion) and more risk taking in the loss domain (i.e., less 
loss aversion), our results suggest that failing to detect inconsistent choices 
might lead to a spurious negative (positive) relationship between CAbs and 
risk (loss) aversion (although in contrast to the suggestion of Chapman et al. 
2018). 
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Still there is a more intricate problem related to the potential number of 
individuals whose choices are labeled as consistent by chance. This is the 
case, for instance, of subjects who never switch (which might be related to 
inattention) or those who make consistent choices by chance although they 
do not understand the decisions. Detecting these individuals does not seem to 
be an easy endeavor. A potential solution might be to ask subjects about the 
procedure they follow to make the choices.  
All in all, the effects and magnitudes are highly sensitive to the task itself and 
the statistical analysis of inconsistent choices. The latter might explain why 
previous results are mixed and somewhat weak (Andersson et al. 2016, 
Dohmen et al. 2018, Lilleholt 2019). 
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APPENDIX 1: Additional regressions 
 
Table A.1. Regression analysis with controls. The impact of CAbs on 
inconsistent DMU 
 Rinconsistent Linconsistent RLinconsistent 
sums 0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
expect sums -0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
overconfidence -0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
reflective -0.18** 
(0.09) 
-0.34*** 
(0.11) 
-0.49*** 
(0.17) 
intuitive 0.08 
(0.10) 
0.22* 
(0.12) 
0.27* 
(0.14) 
convergent -0.14** 
(0.06) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.13 
(0.11) 
N 507 507 507 
Notes: Each cell corresponds to a different regression. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. The regressions using expect sums or 
overconfidence also exclude the three outliers detected. Sampling weights 
are enabled in all regressions. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
 
Table A.2. Regression analysis with all explanatory variables simultaneously. 
The impact of CAbs on inconsistent DMU 
 Rinconsistent Linconsistent RLinconsistent 
sums 0.03 0.07 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
expect sums -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) 
reflective -0.20** -0.36*** -0.54*** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.20) 
convergent -0.11* -0.06 -0.10 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) 
N 553 553 553 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sampling weights are 
enabled in all regressions. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
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Table A.3. Regression analysis with controls. The impact of CAbs on DMU 
 
risk 
aversion 
loss 
aversion 
risk 
averse 
risk 
neutral 
risk 
lover CRRA CRLA 
 OLS OLS Logit Logit Logit OLS OLS 
sums -0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
expect sums -0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.00 
(0.05) 
0.08* 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
overconfidence 0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
reflective 0.04 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.04) 
0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
intuitive -0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.12 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.09) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
convergent -0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
N 507 507 417 417 417 417 440 
 
Table A.4. Regression analysis with all explanatory variables simultaneously. The 
impact of CAbs on DMU 
 
risk 
aversion 
loss 
aversion 
risk 
averse 
risk 
neutral 
risk 
lover CRRA CRLA 
 OLS OLS Logit Logit Logit OLS OLS 
sums -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) 
expect sums -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.08* -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) 
reflective 0.02 0.09** 0.06 -0.08 0.03 0.01 0.04** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) 
convergent -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.02) (0.01) 
N 553 553 454 454 454 454 480 
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APPENDIX 2: Quadratic models for Inconsistency 
 
As explained throughout the paper, we can say that the quadratic model is 
better than the linear model if three conditions are verified: the quadratic term 
is significant, the linear and quadratic terms are jointly significant and the 
Bayesian information criterion for the quadratic model is lower than for the 
linear model.  
Only three models verify the three conditions: 
• Rinconsistent explained by sums. The coefficients associated to sums 
and sums squared are, respectively, 0.32 (p = 0.02) and -0.02 
(p = 0.01). This means that individuals with about eight correct sums 
are the most likely to make inconsistent choices in the risk aversion 
task. Individuals with more or less than eight correct answers were less 
likely to make inconsistent choices. A possible explanation is the lack 
of motivation: those with less than eight correct answers do not really 
care about this task or find it too tiresome (note that for BusEc 
students, having at least eight correct answers in 60 seconds should 
be very easy), hence low math proficiency should not be the 
determinant of extremely low values of sums. If this is the case, this 
result would be indicating that math proficiency is also (just as 
reflective and convergent) negatively related to inconsistent risk 
choices.  
• Linconsistent explained by overconfidence. The coefficients associated 
to overconfidence and its square are, respectively, -0.50 (p = 0.22) and 
0.01 (p = 0.01). However, this result is uniquely due to two individuals 
with overconfidence higher than 10 (i.e., they expected > 10 correct 
answers more than they actually had). In excluding these two 
observations, the significance completely vanishes. 
• RLinconsistent explained by overconfidence. The coefficients 
associated to overconfidence and its square are, respectively, -0.40 
(p = 0.11) and -0.08 (p = 0.03). Yet, again, this result vanishes after 
excluding the two observations with overconfidence > 10. 
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APPENDIX 3: Instructions for risk and loss aversion tasks 
 
Risk aversion: 
You are now going to make 10 decisions about a certain amount of money 
associated with different probabilities. In each scenario you will have to 
choose between two lotteries that assign a probability to two possible 
monetary gains (prizes). Note that choosing a lottery implies playing it. 
The 10 decisions are totally independent of each other. There are no right or 
wrong answers. Make the decision that you feel matches with your own 
preferences. Do not take into account what you decided previously or will 
decide later. 
Payment: For real payments we will randomly select 1 out of 10 decisions. 
Then you will play the lottery you chose in that scenario. So, think carefully 
about your decisions because this will determine the amount of money you 
will earn (if you are selected).  
Please, press START to begin the task 
Start 
 
Choose between the two options for each decision, the one you prefer 
1.  
€40 with 10% probability 
 
€77 with 10% probability 
€32 with 90% probability €2 with 90% probability 
     
2.  
€40 with 20% probability 
 
€77 with 20% probability 
€32 with 80% probability €2 with 80% probability 
     
3.  
€40 with 30% probability 
 
€77 with 30% probability 
€32 with 70% probability €2 with 70% probability 
     
4.  
€40 with 40% probability 
 
€77 with 40% probability 
€32 with 60% probability €2 with 60% probability 
     
5.  
€40 with 50% probability 
 
€77 with 50% probability 
€32 with 50% probability €2 with 50% probability 
     
6.  
€40 with 60% probability 
 
€77 with 60% probability 
€32 with 40% probability €2 with 40% probability 
     
7.  
€40 with 70% probability 
 
€77 with 70% probability 
€32 with 30% probability €2 with 30% probability 
     
8.  
€40 with 80% probability 
 
€77 with 80% probability 
€32 with 20% probability €2 with 20% probability 
     
9.  
€40 with 90% probability 
 
€77 with 90% probability 
€32 with 10% probability €2 with 10% probability 
     
10.  
€40 with 100% probability 
 
€77 with 100% probability 
€32 with 0% probability €2 with 0% probability 
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Loss aversion: 
Just for starting you will receive a €35 endowment. During this task you will 
have to make 6 decisions about negative (losses) or positive (gains) amounts 
of money. In each decision you will be asked to accept or refuse to play a 
lottery. The lottery is extremely simple: we flip a virtual coin and if it comes up 
heads, you can win money, otherwise you lose. The lottery is always the 
same, but from scenario to scenario the amount you lose increases. Note that 
choosing a lottery implies playing it (you may either win or lose). 
The 6 decisions are totally independent of each other. There are no right or 
wrong answers. Make the decision that you feel matches with your own 
preferences. Do not take into account what you decided previously or will 
decide later. 
The amount of money you earn here by playing the lottery will be added to the 
initial endowment of €35. 
Payment: One of your 6 decisions will be chosen randomly for real payments. 
Then we will check whether you decided to play the lottery or not. If you did, 
we will toss the coin to determine whether you earn or lose the prize. If you 
have refused to play, then you will earn €0 plus €35. The €35 endowment is to 
cover potential losses. 
 
Please press START to begin the task 
Start 
 
For each decision, choose if you accept or reject playing the lottery. 
If you reject it, you do not gain or lose anything. 
1. If it's tails, you lose €10 and if it's heads you win €30  Accept  Reject 
2. If it's tails, you lose €15 and if it's heads you win €30  Accept  Reject 
3. If it's tails, you lose €20 and if it's heads you win €30  Accept  Reject 
4. If it's tails, you lose €25 and if it's heads you win €30  Accept  Reject 
5. If it's tails, you lose €30 and if it's heads you win €30  Accept  Reject 
6. If it's tails, you lose €35 and if it's heads you win €30  Accept  Reject 
 
 
